Fieldhouse - part II

I accidentally posted a reply to Haideh (instead of creating my own post) - sorry, learning the ropes, but truly slowly.

In the second part of his book, Fieldhouse is concerned with explaining the character of the government of colonial empires and its impacts on Third World Development. Most prominent feature – imperial rule was “external to each colony” (71). Major consequences of colonialism: the colonized lost their freedom of choice (one can argue it was more than ‘choice’); and, the colonized did not have united national consciousness. If the latter is the absolute fact, it means that the colonizers did not know how to deal with tribes, ethnic groups, religious factions, or whoever they encountered once they colonized the lands. There were no western-style governments and the disconnect created was not only the ignorance but the unpreparedness of the colonizers and the sheer scope of what they had to deal with in an unfamiliar territory. What the author sees as the three main shortcomings of the colonial state (1. it never connected to or understood the needs of the colonized; 2. it had split loyalties between the metropolis and the colony; and, 3. it did not have the legitimacy since it did not have the “voluntary support” of the colonized; p. 89-90) would not only contribute to the future resistance and eventual decolonization, but it also shows the lack of vision for the future on the colonizers’ part as they did not foresee these shortfalls as something that would cause the demise of that form of exploitative/territorial imperialism. What is valuable in this part II of Fieldhouse’s work are the author’s explanations of different imperial economic systems (British, French, and others). The British system can be summarized as follows: the economy of the empires was supported by the producers in the colonies through the bulk-buying and marketing-board systems, the latter which became corrupt because of local politicians’ need for greed. The French imperial economic policy had a once-sided protectionist policy: French goods entered most of the colonies duty free but foreign goods paid “the same duties as if entering France” and not all colonial exports entered France duty free (sugar as an example since competing with France’s sugar beet production). Fieldhouse does not interpret the system of surprix in connection to its incorporation into the economic structure of EEC after 1958. He also introduces the Stabex system after 1975 as if his audience members are all economics experts. Another feature of colonialism which further embedded colonies into the imperial economy was the currency, especially the ability of the currency to connect the colonies with the global world system. In this second part of the book, Fieldhouse’s original concept of optimists and pessimists is neglected as he does not show its relation to the elaborate economic discourse he presented.

Fieldhouse - part III

I thought that readings would give me a headache but alas, it is the technology that is fighting with m. No idea how I was able to get to this point - random clicking works; let's see if I can do it again.

Fieldhouse - part III

In part III, Fieldhouse does return to the original argument between the optimists and the pessimists in explaining the West’s influence on the economic development on the rest of the world up until the 1960s. The author’s argument in the ensuing chapters revolves around two central themes: the comparative advantage and vent for surplus. One of the most important economic events that impacted the global economy as well as the economic integration was the financial crisis of the 1930s. As a closeted ‘optimist’ Fieldhouse elaborately explains how Latin America in particular developed through product diversification and manufacturing and exports, and thus appears to have benefited from the incorporation into the international division of labor, at least before 1929. An example of Argentina, which protected industrialization at the expense of agriculture (i.e., low prices paid for agricultural products in order to keep the food prices down in the cities), reminds of Russia after its revolutionary period and well into the 1920s where this practice was also implemented. Fieldhouse goes on to describe the Australian and New Zealand experience and the significance of their incorporation into the global economic system. He does not specifically emphasize the geographic location or the ethnic makeup of these colonies which could explain their economic success story, but instead claims that their main staple, wool, was the pillar of their economic development since it “remained the property of the original producer” (148). The question arises, which the author only briefly toys with, whether Australia was more dependent or more autonomous? It was an exclusionist society as the settlers did not find it imperative to share the benefits of economic integration into the world system with the native, economically undeveloped population. The case of New Zealand has weak theoretical support as the four sources Fieldhouse uses focus on different arguments.
The author is not very partial to Marxists and examines the interaction between imposed capitalism and the native society more closely (e.g., ‘articulation’ in Africa). His example of Ghana is presented in a way that it blames Ghana for not making the most of opportunities for wealth creation (exports, etc.). Fieldhouse also blames British colonialism for letting the economic forces guide the success or failure of the colonies’ economies. As Fieldhouse is unable to answer the key question he set out to answer (what were the benefits or disadvantages of a developing economy integrated into the international division of labor), he does conclude that a) as long as the colony was “able to develop viable export products, it benefited proportionately as much as any independent state” yet it had no freedom of choice and was ‘encouraged’ and ‘guided’ by the colonizer which product(s) to develop and export; and, b) “the impact of colonialism as a recruiting sergeant for the international division of labor appears to have been limited” as the general economic development trends were influenced more by international economy than imperial policy. Here Fieldhouse fails to see the logic that the empires were active participants and creators of the international economy that they helped shape, and therefore indirectly influenced the economic development of the colonies.
[Vocabulary: external trade coefficient – the ratio between trade and GDP]
[Vocabulary: cif and fob prices -Cost, Insurance and Freight (CIF) – An international trade term of sale in which, for the quoted price, the seller/exporter/manufacturer clears the goods past the ship’s rail at the port of shipment (not destination). The seller is also responsible for paying for the costs associated with transport of the goods to the named port at destination. However, once the goods pass the ship’s rail at the port of shipment, the buyer assumes responsibility for risk of loss or damage as well as any additional transport costs. The seller is also responsible for procuring and paying for marine insurance in the buyer’s name for the shipment. The Cost and Freight term is used only for ocean or inland waterway transport. Free On Board (FOB) – An international trade term of sale in which, for the quoted price, the seller/exporter/manufacturer clears the goods for export and is responsible for the costs and risks of delivering the goods past the ship’s rail at the named port of shipment. The Free On Board term is used only for ocean or inland waterway transport. (From: www.speedycargo.com/resource-center/cif-vs-fob)]
[Vocabulary: monopsony – buyer’s monopoly (From: www.dictionary.com)]

Reading Young!

I have some issues with Young"s classifications in general and will randomly look at some of them:

1- Migration:

Portraying colonialists as "modern day migrants" (P.20) is conceptually confusing and creates a lingual/knowledge based regrouping which is epistemologically unsound! Modern day migrants adhere to norms of the host society, and follow their rules, only criminal migrant elements covertly question the host's societal system, colonialist overtly and collectively and violently shattered the hosts' societal system. Power/hegemony has been taken away from the equation, by Young, which neither makes the argument modern nor post-modern, it just omits an omnipresent variable disappear from his writing and makes his writing more vulnerable!

Forced migration does not apply to slavery; slavery was in every sense reduction of humans to means of production, to be used by other humans to create surplus value (oxen, plough etc). Had slaves been forced migrants on arrival on the port of entry they could choose their course of actions like Irish in The USA. Slaves were either bought or kidnapped, any migrant has, however limited, a choice in entering a work contract...(Mexican seasonal workers in the USA once they cross the border). This again is a case of taking power arbitrarily out of the equation, which makes his work look inaccurate.

Imperialism:
With imperialism, a lingual/ knowledge power game is played, in that imperialism, and its use was introduced by critiques of monopoly/finance capital in the first place. In this sense imperialism has nothing to do with empires and imperials, it refers to a stage in capitalism that in its trajectory becomes MNC.

He also does the same thing with colonialism and talks about ethnic minorities in a national setting as internal colony, this is also a misleading classification; Azeri Turks of Iran have been living side by side with the Parsis for as long as history goes, at times they had their own kingdoms ruling the whole country. Bundling ethic minorities in their modern nation state setting with colonial conquest shows lack of historical perspective in the writer's part. His classification methodology is based on consistently reducing, denying and omitting power from the relationship.

Haideh

Reading Fieldhouse!

Fieldhouse under the two headings; optimists and pessimist gives a brief, but very helpful introduction to the history of economic thoughts, all with an ideological twist that the reader needs to bear in mind. I am gonna try to deconstruct his writings in order to explore his assumptions in ideological level.

He builds his premise by asking "Have the third world countries benefited or suffered from close economic relationship with the more developed countries of the west?"(P.3). In any economic encounter that two willing parities chose to enter there is a risk of winning and losing. But was and is the relationship just an economic one? Was there a choice? Where both sides willing? I just cannot fit in slavery into a close economic ... nor can I fit recent and ongoing "marketing strategy!" in Iraq into his classification!

Classifications can be very insidious, so we have read, but "his useful organizing concepts" (P.9) of optimists and pessimists, somehow puts the onus on the readers as well as the third world countries. Obviously, all developed countries are very optimistic and that's why they sometimes literally force feed this economic optimism to the pessimist third world countries who might not know what is good for them! His classification also is ideologically loaded: all on the "benefiting" side of the argument are happy cheerful optimists - including the academics who articulate these theories - and all critical of status co are bunch of pessimist losers!

I think he should have read Smith more carefully as he quotes him "each society can benefit from what another can offer" and the whole argument is about that offer that free will. once I passed the ideological hurdle all was very informative, almost a complete history of economic thoughts.

Haideh

Young - Intro and Part I

More of my opinions, this time on Young...

Young – part I

Has the postcolonialism truly been associated mostly with transnational migration, diaspora, and internationalism, and anti-colonialism too exclusively with a provincial nationalism? Young seems to think so. Unlike Fieldhouse, Young does not want to use the term Third World and instead opts to utilize ‘three continents’ or ‘tricontinental’ throughout the book. Thus, within the first few pages he lays out the basic premise of the postcolonial, or tricontinental, critique which claims that the process of European expansion between 1492 and 1945 was “specific and problematic” (p. 5). Its source is the “revolutionary activism of the past” (p. 10). It ascribes the feelings of superiority to the west by means of technological advancements, which in turn imposed cultural superiority and common economic path to countries lumped together on a path that might not have been theirs if not for the involvement and superimposition of the west.
Young also writes that the liberation movements fighting the colonial powers worked in solidarity with the European working class. He also claims this international solidarity between the workers against capitalist forces continues even today. Unless he considers protests outside different G20 meeting venues as an example of solidarity, there is little overt evidence of this actually happening. Solidarity of workers is mostly contained within state boundaries, at most within similar ethnic regions, and it almost invariably takes the form of strikes or general strikes.
The author’s main argument is that “postcolonial critique… is the product of resistance to colonialism and imperialism” (p. 15). In his chapter on colonialism he differentiates between colonialism (British, French) and imperialism (Roman, Ottoman). The former was driven by the economic aims from the metropolitan center while the latter was the policy of the state driven by the desire for power. Young mentions some of the most prominent theoreticians of postcolonial theory, such as Said, Sartre, and Fanon. Some of the important historic dates he mentions, such as the Berlin conference of 1884-85 which carved up Africa and the islands of the Pacific, and WWI after which at Versailles the victors divided up the colonial spoils, demarcate some of the crucial key moments in world history. Since colonial powers were not original in their strategy of ‘conquest and domination,’ Young even finds the way to mock them by calling them the “mimic men” (as in mimicking the Roman Empire’s model).
Neocolonialism is simply a continuation of colonialism through economic hegemony by which the former masters continue to create dependence of former colonized states, and especially through WTO, the World Bank, or the IMF. Even though Ghanian leader Nkrumah hoped in his book that neocolonialism is the last gasp of imperialism, we cannot be too optimistic as the economic chains are heavy and binding. It is also possible, as the anthropologist Gupta argues, that the underdevelopment has become an identity for the LDCs.
Young’s chapter on Postcolonialism looks awfully similar to Berger’s article. Where Young’s arguments part with Berger’s is in the idea of ‘brief colonization’ and ‘prolonged colonization.’ Young claims that in those countries where the colonial period was relatively brief (he does not define what brief means and what countries fall into this category), it would be “ridiculous to suggest that the colonial era somehow constituted the defining feature of their histories” (p. 60). What is truly ridiculous about Young’s argument is that any interruption of the normal functioning of the state and its people must be considered an impact which somehow affects the trajectory of indigenous development, and it could be considered one of the defining features of local history. Postcolonialism to Young means revolutionary Marxism, liberation movements, freedom struggles, and internationalism (whatever the last term means as he does not define it). What is interesting is that the author sees the irony about the location of the postcolonial critique – universities of USA and Great Britain, contemporary and past imperial powers respectively. Young sees the noble cause of postcolonial theory of undoing the ideological heritage in the decolonized countries and the west itself. What is problematic about this idea is that the west is interpreting what deemed as ideological wrongs while the economic bonds with the west still hold strong in most of the LDCs.

Fieldhouse - part I by Ivana

Trying to catch up and don't even have time to be interactive too much...I think all this economic speak and readings are leaving me speechless. :)

Fieldhouse – Part I
The subject of Fieldhouse’s book is not only about the debate between the pessimists (who claim that the penalties outweighed the benefits of the integration of the LDCs into the world system) and the optimists (who believe that the integration brought benefits which the Third World countries could not have provides for themselves in any foreseeable future). Fieldhouse also analyzes the instruments of colonialism in the first part and the effects of trade and colonialism on the welfare of LDCs during the first fifty years of the XX century. However, he is not always subtle about his own agenda and feelings towards the subject, especially in part III of his book.
The book is laden with principles of economic theory which at first intimidate the reader unfamiliar with the concepts. The two concepts that he uses as the basis for his argument, supported throughout the book with different examples across different continents, are the benefits of specialization and the theory of comparative costs or advantage. These two arguments form the core of the free-market idea and therefore successful trade and investment across the globe. Fieldhouse also concludes that the neoclassical economists postulate that “trade increases wealth and welfare, both by specialization and by a ‘vent-for-surplus’.” Free trade is one condition that maximizes the advantages of the principles mentioned. The obstacles to free trade, created by the economic crises namely after WWI, were curtailed by the GATT agreement of 1947 (reduction of tariffs). The success of the theory of ‘growth through trade’ has been confirmed in settler communities of Australia, New Zealand, United States, Argentina, etc., but this is not universally true, particularly in most African countries, South and Southeast Asia, and China. Pessimists argue that this limited success was due to eight main factors: 1) trading firms were foreign and did not employ a lot of native population; 2) selling prices were dictated by the international market forces; 3) the trading system was mostly controlled by the expatriates; 4) the export production sector was very specialized (i.e., mines, plantations could not always utilize a wide spectrum of skills of the indigenous population); 5) internal and international transport was controlled by monopolistic cartels and/or firms, and so the share of the profits did not trickle down to the home-society; 6) foreign trading companies manipulated the prices they paid to the native producer and what they charged the consumer; 7) profits were mostly exported since main trading enterprises were foreign owned; and, 8) free market leaves the indigenous society vulnerable to the pressures of imported goods which could undersell local products, often not made by modern technological tools which are too expensive for the local economy to implement, therefore leaving the native society too dependent on imports.
Fieldhouse further subdivides pessimists into five categories which he labeled a) liberals and humanitarians (most prominent humanitarian André Gide, and most prominent liberal economist Adam Smith); b) the development economists who propagated that LDCs must industrialize (most important: Maynard Keynes); c) ‘dependency’ theorists (I. Wallerstein and his ‘core,’ ‘semi-periphery,’ and ‘periphery’ economic system which reflects the international division of labor and the practice of transferring surplus from periphery to core); d) the Marxists and the neo-Marxists (including Marx as well); and, e) ‘unequal exchange’ proponents (A. Gunder Frank, R. Luxemburg: trade is the means by which the West exploits other countries and creates obstacles to the growth and development of the Third World; LDC pays more for goods that it imports than it receives for its exports).
Even though Fieldhouse is fairly detailed in his economic foundation of the book, his first part provides a good synopsis of economic theories, principles, and their relationship to one another and colonialism, and how relevant they will be in chapters to come. It would have been useful to Fieldhouse to narrow down a few of these principles most relevant to his own favorite argument.
[Vocabulary: ‘vent-for-surplus’ theory – first proposed by Smith, trade provides the output for the excess of goods produced in a home country and therefore promotes economic growth; opposed by Ricardo who claimed that the domestic production must be reallocated so that the society can produce what is most profitable for exchange with other countries]
[Vocabulary: ‘articulation’ – process which describes how capitalism depended heavily on the relations with pre-capitalist societies for raw materials and foodstuffs in order to keep down the variable capital (wages) and reduce the cost of constant capital (means of production); Fieldhouse, p. 48.]

Ivana - a take on Berger's article

Berger’s article about history, destiny and the fate of the Third Worldism is as its author states “an introductory article” to clarify the constraints and the appeal of Third Worldism. He covers this movement from the late 1940s to the 1990s but considers the different agenda and scope of the first and second generation patterns and characteristics. He sees its decline as a product of global political changes, namely the era of the Cold War and the contradictions emerging from the process of decolonization.
The pivotal event, according to Berger, which put the Third World ‘on the map’ was the Bandung Conference of 1955. The non-aligned nation-states wanted to bring attention to their own concerns amidst the developed countries’ race for power and political and economic domination. Leaders of the Third World countries (Nehru of India, Nasser of Egypt, Nkrumah of Ghana, Sukarno of Indonesia, among others) called for closer cultural and technological cooperation between African and Asian governments; more support for self-determination of peoples and nations; and demanded the creation of the development fund to be overseen by the UN which would assist the economies of the countries in question. Another significant historical moment, which Berger only briefly touches upon, is the emergence of China as an economic and political polar actor.
What is also interesting to note is the idealistic tone of the Third World movement. It attempted to unify ideologies (Marxism, nationalism, Pan-Arabism) and religion (e.g., Islam in Indonesia) and yet these elements were all region- or country-specific and possibly condemned the movement to its demise by never really defining it in terms of pure non-alignment and the goals that the countries set at the Bandung Conference. This is something that the author misses in his analysis of the Third Worldism. Berger also does not expand on the idea of radicalism of the second generation of the movement, nor how it truly contributed to the downfall of Third Worldism. Che Guevara was represented as the personification of “revolutionary idealism and Third Worldism” during the second-generation.
Decolonization aside, the UN’s idea of and call for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) during the 1970s was too utopian as a concept. The vagueness of the idea about the “new global structure,” which would have the power to “reorganize global markets and extract taxes at a global level and then redistribute them globally as well,” is not criticized by the author, nor does he really imply with certain effectiveness to what extent did the rise of oil-rich and anti-communist states represent the obstacle to the advancement of the Third World project. What is also interesting to note is the new wave of ‘colonialism’ emanating from the IMF and the World Bank, which in the 1980s begins to dictate the political and economic terms to the developing world, and demands privatization of their public sectors, and deregulation of their financial sectors. Maybe the most significant observation that Berger makes is the notion that the capitalist transformation of Asia undermined the Third Worldist idea. He openly proclaims that the state-centered character of the movement is also responsible for its failure, and even the idea of neo-Third Worldism seems to be “intellectually and conceptually bankrupt.” First-generation leaders had the right ideas and ideals, but it was imminent that the corruption of government’s key bureaucracies during the second period and lack of strong historical and political connectivity among these nations also played a part in the demise of Third Worldism.

music from the periphery

Dear All, just to hold the human in equipose with the economic some music by K'naan a Somalian musician.The first is the world cup anthem, the other a critique of Somolia and the third an inspirational call to Africa! Interestingly in the first you see the role of coke. Mabye despite itself capitalism rather than socialism withers the state, but then affirms the nation? While the process has its own kind of incidiousness, it also has its creative fusions, it spaces of hope-- what permutations this world will take in the coming years for good or for ill remains to be seen. I would also be interested to know what if any reactions this video received from the muslim world?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=apeVbw02nzc

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7lCPXEARpE8&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o9INGLg5iiQ&feature=related

Happy listening.

Talk about the rise of the Rest...

...What happened to France and Germany!?

Thoughts on Readings Random Economic Ramblings

Amsden's article stood out most in my mind. Her reference to the rise of the Asian Tigers and discussion of the industrial revolutions in Britain, the U.S., and Germany led me to consider the current state of the U.S. economy. I think it was her (or maybe it was Berger) discussion of Primitive Accumulation and the Enclosure Movement that led me to look more at MNC's than states. I have no research or proof for the following, just international economic guessing and wondering.

It seems that labor and technology "filter down" or in a sense, across. States that achieve a stable political system with a favorable economic climate allow for innovation and entrepreneurship (a version of the somewhat misguided modernization theory). Those entrepreneurs create a technology and seek to build and sell it. Due to finances, political support, etc. they build in their home country first. Once the technology is perfected and laborers become unionized and more skilled in the production, laborer pay and benefits increase. Over the course of time, the laborers accumulate an expectation for a high standard of living and become involved in the conspicuous consumption of products. Moreover, their work makes the corporation extremely prosperous (for example, the U.S. automobile industry in the 1950's).

The corporation, meanwhile, in the business of profit accumulation, seeks to maximize its profits. Because workers in the industrialized state (the U.S.) have reached such a high standard of living, the corporation looks to a cheaper labor source in a state that is beyond "developing" but not so developed as to have a high standard of living. The corporation becomes an MNC, shifting its production to the next state/region of the planet.

Slowly, the state that has established an extremely high standard of living moves to the international economic periphery, away from the core that it inhabited for however many years, decades, perhaps centuries. The question is, how does this state "re-balance" its economy? Economic recession and/or recession seems inevitable. How does the state escape the downturn? New innovations that reinvigorate the system and restart the cycle? Is the cycle the second or third time shorter in duration? Does a revolution have to occur?

For the former periphery states now turned core states, how long do they enjoy the MNC's occupation? What is the impact of consumption and societal values in terms of how long it takes for the standard of living to increase to the extent that the MNC (s) move on to the next peripheral state?

It seems to me that this is what has occurred here in the U.S., especially in the automotive industry and computer/tech sectors. Moreover, the MNC's essentially rule the day. They are the "Primitive Accumulators." Is it advantageous for states moving from core to periphery, like the U.S., to ensure world instability to make sure MNC's do not "re-base" their labor? Can a state survive as a service economy (increasingly, the U.S.) as opposed to a production economy? For how long? Can a state like China maintain a dictatorial regime with a liberalizing economy?

The World as an Idea!

The good thing about world as an idea is that, one may detect infinite perceptions of it. I do not think that there ever was a consensus on a monolithic world system as such. Many third world writers including some leading Indians on the subject - Chudhury comes to mind, always believed in the existence of many other systems under the hegemonic layer. Those systems had to adjust to the demands and manipulations of the existing hegemonic world system, but I do not think they ever vanished from the equation.
So, in fact the regional divisions of labour was always there, albeit in constant struggle to survive. So, we may not go back to the dark ages, but just to where many many poles in human scale interacted with each other, and not under one hegemon. This will in fact take the monopoly out of capital and all will be fine happily ever after!!

My Thoughts...

So.... below are my thoughts that I posted as a comment... I think I might have this figured out now...

The World As An Idea:

Ok, so I don't really know what was said in discussion Monday night since I was not there, so I am just going to comment on a few things in the reading that stood out to me...

First of all, it struck me that Young was incredibly blunt in his views on colonialism. It wasn't until reading his description of the differences between imperialism and colonialism that I really thought of them as separate. I have always viewed them as very much intertwined.

Another random statement that for some reason caught my attention was the statement that the elimination of the French in Canada eliminated a threat and encouraged the American colonies to seek independence from Britain. I had never stopped to think about it that way... Maybe that's just me and my limited in-depth study of American history, which is about to change as I have been assigned to teach US History for the first time after teaching World History for five years.

Another point that really caught my attention in these readings as well as my readings for another class is that some cultures seem to take on this idea that their culture is superior to all others simply because other cultures are different... What gives people the idea that they are better just because others are different? Maybe I don't get it because I generally tend to be way more critical of myself than I am of others... I don't know.

Another element of the readings that stood out to me was the pessimist/optimist approach in Fieldhouse. Maybe it is because of my worldview but I don't think that relations between the West and the Third World can ever be viewed in such black and white terms. It is so much more complicated than that in my opinion. I think that we need to consider why we have taken the approach we have with our interactions with the Third World and as one of the wealthier nations in the world what our responsibility is to help the countries in the Third World develop so they can support themselves. And we also need to acknowledge that we could do so much more to encourage the development of these countries.

Sorry if my comments seem random and scatter-brained.... Unfortunately, that's how my mind works.

Predictions on the next world-system and the BRIC nations' sort of Joker-like role in its creation

In the Economist article Proftoft* linked to a few posts ago, it seemed to me that the author was suggesting that the "North" was in danger of switching places with the "South" in regards to economic vitality and Debt-to-GDP ratio, and that the BRIC nations had become midwives for the current mutated iteration of the traditional core-periphery relationship between the West and the "Rest".

The Economist Article!

I liked the Economist article a lot Carolyn, the fact that such an acknowledgement has found its way into Economist is a way forward. I think the third world industrialization/development, via a network of third world investment, has been happening for a long while, its pace accelerated dramatically in a third word context after china's embargo was lifted. But its acknowledgement by the World Bank also means recognizing a long standing claim of the third world countries to the reform of the power structure of the existing world management institutions; UN and the Security Council. In recent debates on Iran 180+ NAM countries expressed their strong views which went unnoticed by the UN existing structure. One outcome can be reforming the UN in way that it reflects, more democratically, the views of the UN hitherto subalterns. One member one vote and no veto, a much overdue political reform.
I am going to try to post this, wish me luck!

Intelligent comments from Haideh, not from Tres.

With the successful late industrialization cases I have a couple of comments to make: That it initially happened in countries that for whatever reasons were in a better position to accumulate capital in the first place. African countries were not among them, Roy, because they did not have control over their capital generating resources. Had they had, their excess population would have worked in their favour.Anyway, Roy, I agree with you, and the fact that Africa was not in a position to be challenged the way China was with the embargo. ISI, learning, technology and the embargo, Carolyn, I think worked hand in hand there - the 70s jokes about the Chinese village steel industry... ISI is a powerful tool, I understood from reading Amsden tonight, but so is IMF and the WB, that can somehow have serious adverse effect on the process of accumulation of capital to be invested in industrial sector in the first place. Germany in the European context was an example of late industrialization, but the process of accumulation of capital did not face a powerful inhibitory/delaying challenge. My questions, therefore is how late is a late industrialization? And I am thinking loud here, industrialization that happened during the earlier formative phases of the monopoly capital had faced less obstacles than the late comers.However, there are some encouraging news from Africa, Roy, in that the small-countries-working-with-each-other type of investments in industrial sector, especially, are successful there. I think Africa is picking up in that we have many Chinese, third world self help and NAM kind of investments there, in small scales that are manageable by indigenous work force. It is true that productive trade and investment activities between Africa and the first world, which could have potentially lead to accumulation of capital in the twentieth century, is almost non-existent, but what we call the emerging small regional powers are very much active there, small manageable loans with small rate of interest and and of course favorable tariffs, ISI and measures.I absolutely enjoyed our get-together yesterday, thank you everybody and thank you Helena.

Import Substitution Industrialization

By way of contributing to our running glossary of terms, here is a defintion of Import Substituion:
Government strategy that emphasizes replacement of some agricultural or industrial imports to encourage local production for local consumption, rather than producing for export markets. Import substitutes are meant to generate employment, reduce foreign exchange demand, stimulate innovation, and make the country self-reliant in critical areas such as food, defense, and advanced technology.
Defintion provided by http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/import-substitution.html

Third World Setting

Inquiry (historical, social scientific, or policy oriented) into the state of the Third World or Less Developed Countries (LDC) tends to assume the enduring realities of disadvantage. While there may be a number of empirical indexes that reveal the yawning gap between the "West" and the "Rest" so much of the scholarship has narrowed in either on the sins of western imperialism or at times the benchmark of western development. Neither of these foci account sufficiently for the complexity of global/local interactions. They have failed to imagine a world where the "West" while hegemonic never settled into every nook and cranny and never became the only stick by which human beings measured their daily lives. Even more importantly they have not sufficiently grappled with the real and emerging shift-- what Alice Amsden has called "the Rise of the Rest." The reorganization in economic relations between the core and the periphery now underway will not only change our collective futures, it will begin to readjust the way we understand the global past. The portrait of the subaltern--once framed by the mercator projection--is certain to acquire new characteristics along with this emerging economic and hence political geography. Making sense of new conditions will require nascent paradigms, not necessarily better or worse, just different. I encourage you to pursue the rest of the readings for this course with this in mind. For more information on the economic shift eastward, this is a very useful piece in the Economist (forwarded to me by my friend Dr. Guy Laron of Hebrew University) http://www.economist.com/node/16329442?story_id=16329442

Gosh

That's a heck of a way to start things off, Robert...but I like it. :-)

Roy, we'll take good blogging care of you. I've only been blogging for about seven months or so, but now that I've started I've done a ton of it. It's fun if you keep it focused*. I'm not too much into writing about myself that much, though, so I stick to links and interviews and posting other people's fiction.

So, in the spirit of the preceding paragraph, what is the primary purpose of this blog? To write about our thoughts and insights as we read our material? To brag about the fact that my one year old kid has already read Infinite Jest**? To discuss our research and our future careers as experts of our respective fields? To plot a small, but not insignificant, overthrow of the current Humanities regime at GSU and raise Proftoft*** as Supreme Commander of History and the other, lesser Humanities? I'm down with any of these things, actually, but I just want to make sure I'm using this blog correctly before I start wasting everyone's time with barely literate ramblings on my feelings about Hannah Arendt's On Violence or whether it would have been better to wait to make Super Mario Bros: The Movie until after CGI had been invented and made cost-effective.

Anyway, that's the word for now. See y'all next week or whenever we're meeting next.

P.S. Go USA! Down with the Redcoats!


*My focus has primarily been about the craft of writing.
**This is, of course, a joke, but if you follow the link you can see an awesome picture of my then-seven-month-old son looking suave next to a copy of Infinite Jest.
***I just made that up...I don't think anyone calls her that. In fact, it's probably better if no one speaks of this again.

Well...

this is new territory for me - I am a self confessed anti-blogger! Looking forward to this journey with y'all, and I am not frightened to ask anyone if they will hold my hand, reassure me and guide me through blogger hell! Of course I joke, maybe, but not really.

Should be fun

Looking forward to working with all of you.