Trying to catch up and don't even have time to be interactive too much...I think all this economic speak and readings are leaving me speechless. :)
Fieldhouse – Part I
The subject of Fieldhouse’s book is not only about the debate between the pessimists (who claim that the penalties outweighed the benefits of the integration of the LDCs into the world system) and the optimists (who believe that the integration brought benefits which the Third World countries could not have provides for themselves in any foreseeable future). Fieldhouse also analyzes the instruments of colonialism in the first part and the effects of trade and colonialism on the welfare of LDCs during the first fifty years of the XX century. However, he is not always subtle about his own agenda and feelings towards the subject, especially in part III of his book.
The book is laden with principles of economic theory which at first intimidate the reader unfamiliar with the concepts. The two concepts that he uses as the basis for his argument, supported throughout the book with different examples across different continents, are the benefits of specialization and the theory of comparative costs or advantage. These two arguments form the core of the free-market idea and therefore successful trade and investment across the globe. Fieldhouse also concludes that the neoclassical economists postulate that “trade increases wealth and welfare, both by specialization and by a ‘vent-for-surplus’.” Free trade is one condition that maximizes the advantages of the principles mentioned. The obstacles to free trade, created by the economic crises namely after WWI, were curtailed by the GATT agreement of 1947 (reduction of tariffs). The success of the theory of ‘growth through trade’ has been confirmed in settler communities of Australia, New Zealand, United States, Argentina, etc., but this is not universally true, particularly in most African countries, South and Southeast Asia, and China. Pessimists argue that this limited success was due to eight main factors: 1) trading firms were foreign and did not employ a lot of native population; 2) selling prices were dictated by the international market forces; 3) the trading system was mostly controlled by the expatriates; 4) the export production sector was very specialized (i.e., mines, plantations could not always utilize a wide spectrum of skills of the indigenous population); 5) internal and international transport was controlled by monopolistic cartels and/or firms, and so the share of the profits did not trickle down to the home-society; 6) foreign trading companies manipulated the prices they paid to the native producer and what they charged the consumer; 7) profits were mostly exported since main trading enterprises were foreign owned; and, 8) free market leaves the indigenous society vulnerable to the pressures of imported goods which could undersell local products, often not made by modern technological tools which are too expensive for the local economy to implement, therefore leaving the native society too dependent on imports.
Fieldhouse further subdivides pessimists into five categories which he labeled a) liberals and humanitarians (most prominent humanitarian André Gide, and most prominent liberal economist Adam Smith); b) the development economists who propagated that LDCs must industrialize (most important: Maynard Keynes); c) ‘dependency’ theorists (I. Wallerstein and his ‘core,’ ‘semi-periphery,’ and ‘periphery’ economic system which reflects the international division of labor and the practice of transferring surplus from periphery to core); d) the Marxists and the neo-Marxists (including Marx as well); and, e) ‘unequal exchange’ proponents (A. Gunder Frank, R. Luxemburg: trade is the means by which the West exploits other countries and creates obstacles to the growth and development of the Third World; LDC pays more for goods that it imports than it receives for its exports).
Even though Fieldhouse is fairly detailed in his economic foundation of the book, his first part provides a good synopsis of economic theories, principles, and their relationship to one another and colonialism, and how relevant they will be in chapters to come. It would have been useful to Fieldhouse to narrow down a few of these principles most relevant to his own favorite argument.
[Vocabulary: ‘vent-for-surplus’ theory – first proposed by Smith, trade provides the output for the excess of goods produced in a home country and therefore promotes economic growth; opposed by Ricardo who claimed that the domestic production must be reallocated so that the society can produce what is most profitable for exchange with other countries]
[Vocabulary: ‘articulation’ – process which describes how capitalism depended heavily on the relations with pre-capitalist societies for raw materials and foodstuffs in order to keep down the variable capital (wages) and reduce the cost of constant capital (means of production); Fieldhouse, p. 48.]
More on Fieldhouse - parts II
ReplyDeleteIn the second part of his book, Fieldhouse is concerned with explaining the character of the government of colonial empires and its impacts on Third World Development. Most prominent feature – imperial rule was “external to each colony” (71). Major consequences of colonialism: the colonized lost their freedom of choice (one can argue it was more than ‘choice’); and, the colonized did not have united national consciousness. If the latter is the absolute fact, it means that the colonizers did not know how to deal with tribes, ethnic groups, religious factions, or whoever they encountered once they colonized the lands. There were no western-style governments and the disconnect created was not only the ignorance but the unpreparedness of the colonizers and the sheer scope of what they had to deal with in an unfamiliar territory. What the author sees as the three main shortcomings of the colonial state (1. it never connected to or understood the needs of the colonized; 2. it had split loyalties between the metropolis and the colony; and, 3. it did not have the legitimacy since it did not have the “voluntary support” of the colonized; p. 89-90) would not only contribute to the future resistance and eventual decolonization, but it also shows the lack of vision for the future on the colonizers’ part as they did not foresee these shortfalls as something that would cause the demise of that form of exploitative/territorial imperialism. What is valuable in this part II of Fieldhouse’s work are the author’s explanations of different imperial economic systems (British, French, and others). The British system can be summarized as follows: the economy of the empires was supported by the producers in the colonies through the bulk-buying and marketing-board systems, the latter which became corrupt because of local politicians’ need for greed. The French imperial economic policy had a once-sided protectionist policy: French goods entered most of the colonies duty free but foreign goods paid “the same duties as if entering France” and not all colonial exports entered France duty free (sugar as an example since competing with France’s sugar beet production). Fieldhouse does not interpret the system of surprix in connection to its incorporation into the economic structure of EEC after 1958. He also introduces the Stabex system after 1975 as if his audience members are all economics experts. Another feature of colonialism which further embedded colonies into the imperial economy was the currency, especially the ability of the currency to connect the colonies with the global world system. In this second part of the book, Fieldhouse’s original concept of optimists and pessimists is neglected as he does not show its relation to the elaborate economic discourse he presented.
Fieldhouse - part II
ReplyDeleteIn the second part of his book, Fieldhouse is concerned with explaining the character of the government of colonial empires and its impacts on Third World Development. Most prominent feature – imperial rule was “external to each colony” (71). Major consequences of colonialism: the colonized lost their freedom of choice (one can argue it was more than ‘choice’); and, the colonized did not have united national consciousness. If the latter is the absolute fact, it means that the colonizers did not know how to deal with tribes, ethnic groups, religious factions, or whoever they encountered once they colonized the lands. There were no western-style governments and the disconnect created was not only the ignorance but the unpreparedness of the colonizers and the sheer scope of what they had to deal with in an unfamiliar territory. What the author sees as the three main shortcomings of the colonial state (1. it never connected to or understood the needs of the colonized; 2. it had split loyalties between the metropolis and the colony; and, 3. it did not have the legitimacy since it did not have the “voluntary support” of the colonized; p. 89-90) would not only contribute to the future resistance and eventual decolonization, but it also shows the lack of vision for the future on the colonizers’ part as they did not foresee these shortfalls as something that would cause the demise of that form of exploitative/territorial imperialism. What is valuable in this part II of Fieldhouse’s work are the author’s explanations of different imperial economic systems (British, French, and others). The British system can be summarized as follows: the economy of the empires was supported by the producers in the colonies through the bulk-buying and marketing-board systems, the latter which became corrupt because of local politicians’ need for greed. The French imperial economic policy had a once-sided protectionist policy: French goods entered most of the colonies duty free but foreign goods paid “the same duties as if entering France” and not all colonial exports entered France duty free (sugar as an example since competing with France’s sugar beet production). Fieldhouse does not interpret the system of surprix in connection to its incorporation into the economic structure of EEC after 1958. He also introduces the Stabex system after 1975 as if his audience members are all economics experts. Another feature of colonialism which further embedded colonies into the imperial economy was the currency, especially the ability of the currency to connect the colonies with the global world system. In this second part of the book, Fieldhouse’s original concept of optimists and pessimists is neglected as he does not show its relation to the elaborate economic discourse he presented.